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THE ADMISSION OF A CODEFENDANT'S
CONFESSION AFTER BRUTON V. UNITED
STATES: THE QUESTIONS AND A PROPOSAL
FOR THEIR RESOLUTION
In Bruton v. United States' the United States Supreme Court
overruled Delli Paoli v. United States2 and held that due to the
substantial risk that the jury did not follow the trial court's
instructions to disregard certain inadmissible extrajudicial
statements of an accused's nontestifying codefendant but, rather,
considered the statements in determining the accused's guilt, there
was a denial of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. Bruton
and Evans were jointly tried on a federal charge of armed postal
robbery.4 The prosecution's case consisted of the testimony of two
eyewitnesses, both of whom could identify Evans but only one of
whom could identify Bruton, and the confession of Evans which
implicated both Evans and Bruton.5 Neither Evans nor Bruton took
the stand. When Evans' confession was. introduced into evidence
and again in the jury instructions, the jury was told by the trial court
judge that the confession was admissible only against Evans and
inadmissible hearsay as to Bruton.6 Both Evans and Bruton were
1. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
2. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
3. 391 U.S. at 126.
4. The statute under which Bruton and-Evans were charged is 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1964).
391 U.S. at 124.
5. For the purposes of this discussion "extrajudicial statement" will be considered the
equivalent of "confession," although this would not be true in all contexts.
For a more complete factual setting see Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.
1967). The weakness of the evidence against Bruton was admitted by the Solicitor General,
who urged that the judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
The Solicitor General stated that too great a strain was put on the Delli Paoli rule in
sustaining Bruton's conviction because the evidence against Bruton was not strong. 391 U.S.
at 125-26.
6. 391 U.S. at 125. The instruction in part stated:
A confession made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered as evidence
against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way a party to the
confession. . . . [Y]ou should consider it as evidence in the case against Evans, but
you must not consider it, and should disregard it, in considering the evidence in the
case against Bruton. Id. at 125 n.2.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
found guilty.7 On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed Evans'
conviction on the grounds that his confession should not have been
received into evidence against him.8 Bruton's conviction, however,
was affirmed in reliance on Delli Paoli' on the grounds that when
the judge instructed the jury to disregard Evans's confession in
determining Bruton's guilt or innocence, the jury was presumed to
have done so.'0 The Supreme Court granted Bruton's petition for
certiorari and reversed his conviction."
JOINT TRIAL AND THE PRE-Bruton LAW
The Problems of Joint Trial
Although the joint trial has been praised as a device for saving
time and money, avoiding additional delay in an already
overcrowded trial docket, offering convenience to witnesses, and
preventing inconsistent verdicts, it has also been criticized for
undermining the personal rights of each defendant. 2 This
undermining of the individual defendant's rights results from both
the inherent prejudice and the rules of evidence in a joint trial. 3 Such
prejudice is occasioned by the natural tendency to view the
-defendants as one.14 In addition there exists the risk that the mere
fact of association with another defendant may be prejudicial.,5
Moreover, because joint trials often involve conspiracy cases and
because such cases depend on circumstantial evidence to prove the
essential element of intent, any inference which the jury draws from
the joint trial or from the confusion that device may create could
be crucial to the outcome." Further, under Delli Paoli, where the
7. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1967).
8. Id. at 363.
9. See notes 20-29 infra and accompanying text.
10. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir. 1967).
11. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
12. See Note, Bruton v. United States: A Belated Look at the Warren Court Concept of
Criminal Justice, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 54, 59-60 (1969); Note, Admissibility of
Codefendant's Admissions in Joint Trials, 36 U. CIN. L. REV. 306, 306-07 (1967); 56 COLUI.
L. REV. 1112, 1115 (1956); 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 356, 359 (1967).
13. See 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 356, 359 (1967).
14. Id.; see United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1327 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Diaz,
81 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1969) for two defendants' unsuccessful claims based on the theory
that they and their codefendant were viewed as one. But see Brief for the State of California
as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
15. See Note, Codefendants' Confessions, 3 COLUM. J. L. & SOCIAL PRoBs. 80, 81 (1967).
16. See 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1112, 1113 (1956). The problem of possible prejudice in a joint
trial involving a conspiracy case may be increased by the relaxation of the rules of evidence
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confession of a nontestifying codefendant was admissible against
him but inadmissible hearsay as to the other defendants, the jury was
instructed to consider the confession only against the defendant who
had made it.17 The protection afforded the defendant against whom
the confession was inadmissible was nearly illusory, and the
possibility of prejudicial spillover was great. The jury was presented
with the moral dilemma of determining guilt or innocence either
without evidence which it believed to be probative and which it was
using against another defendant or with such evidence, thereby
violating the judge's instructions.18  Although Delli Paoli is no
longer the law, there remains the above mentioned problem of an
individual's rights being undermined in a joint trial. The prosecutors
who are the beneficiaries of this undermining prefer joint trials.19
This preference arises both from a desire to conserve time and a
realization that when evidence, which would be inadmissible in a
single trial, is admitted in a joint trial subject to a limiting
instruction, the jury might disregard the instruction and consider the
evidence for all purposes.
The Rule of Delli Paoli and Joint Trials
In Delli Paoli v. United States,"° while adhering to the theory
that the jury could be expected to follow the court's instruction and
not consider the confession of a nontestifying codefendant in
determining the guilt or innocence of another defendant, the
Supreme Court recognized that there might be circumstances which
in a conspiracy trial. See Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv.
920, 983-90 (1959); Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 754 (1965); 28 OHIo ST. L.J.
356, 359 (1967). A specific example of thi" relaxation is the easing of the relevancy standard.
See 72 HARV. L. REv., supra at 983. A further source of possible prejudice in conspiracy trials
is the admission of acts in furtherance of a conspiracy which the jury is instructed not to
consider unless it first finds that there is a conspiracy. See United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d
622 (7th Cir. 1969); 113 U. PA. L. REv., supra at 754.
17. See notes 20-29 infra and accompanying text. For an example of a Delli Paoli type
instruction see note 6 supra.
18. See Jack v. United States, 409 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1969); 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 356,
362 (1967). See also Comment, Post-Conspiracy Admissions in Joint
Prosecutions-Effectiveness of Instructions Limiting the Use of Evidence to One Co-
Defendant, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 713 (1957).
19. See O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense under Conspiracy Indictments, 9
BROOKLYN L. REV. 263, 271 (1940); 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 356, 359 (1967). For other factors
which prosecutors consider in determining if they are going to utilize the joint trial see the
text accompanying note 12 supra.
20. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
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would make unreasonable the assumption that the jury did, in fact,
follow the instruction. Delli Paoli involved the joint trial of five
individuals ,charged with unlawful dealing in alcohol. The
government case consisted of the testimony of eyewitnesses and the
confession of one codefendant which was admitted with the normal
limiting instruction.21 On these facts, the Court held that it was
reasonable to assume that the jury followed the judge's instruction 2
In reaching its decision, the Court said that all of the circumstances
of the case must be consideredP Because the trial judge best knows
the circumstances of each case, the Court further stated that the trial
judge's decision to sever the joint trial or not to sever and, therefore,
admit the confession subject to the limiting instruction was reversible
only if the trial judge abused his discretionary power.u In dissenting,
Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other Justices, rejected the
majority's belief that the jury would follow the judge's limiting
instruction.25 It is important to note that neither the Delli Paoli nor
Bruton holdings was concerned with the general prejudice problems
of joint trials but rather they were directed only to the specific
problem of the effectiveness of a judge's instruction concerning the
inadmissibility of a nontestifying codefendant's confession against
another defendant.2 6
Although Delli Paoli did not hold that as a'n absolute rule the
jury was to be presumed to have followed the court's instruction,
trial courts, adhering to Delli Paoli, seldom granted severance, and
appellate courts were slow to reverse the trial courts' decisions.27
Indeed, some courts wint so far as to imply that Delli Paoli
established an absolute rule2 Despite widespread criticism of the
21. Id. at 233.
22. Id. at 241. The Court considered five factors important in determining the
reasonableness of a belief that the instruction to consider the confession of the nontestifying
codefendant as evidence only against him was followed: The simplicity of the conspiracy, the
safeguarding of the individual interest of the defendants, the point in time the confession was
admitted, the contents of the confession, and the lack of any indication of confusion. Id. at
241-42.
23. Id. at 243.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 24648. The dissent's position was that "[t]he Government should not have the
windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter
of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds." Id. at 248.
26. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
27. 72 HARV. L. REv., supra notel6, at 983.
28. See. United States v. Ramos, 268 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. DeFillo,
257 F.2d 835, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 915 (1959). But see United States
v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 216 (2d Cir. 1966).
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belief that the jury could or would follow the court's instruction in
a Delli Paoli situation, only a small minority of states abandoned
the Delli Paoli rule.29
The Erosion of Delli Paoli
In two pre-Bruton cases the Supreme Court foreshadowed its
overruling of Delli Paoli. In Douglas v. Alabama,3' a co-indictee,
who had been tried separately, was called as a witness by the state
prosecutor. After the co-indictee had invoked the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecutor, under the guise of
leading a hostile witness, read the co-indictee's confession which
implicated Douglas. The Court held that this constituted a denial of
Douglas' right to cross-examination, secured by the sixth
amendment right of confrontation.3' The holding was based upon the
premise that the jury could not be expected to disregard the
prosecutor's reading of the confession and that Douglas could not
effectively cross-examine one who had invoked the fifth amendment
and, thus, refused to affirm the confession.32 The more significant
foreshadowing of Delli Paoli's demise was Jackson v. Denno,
33
where the Supreme Court invalidated a New York procedure which
allowed the jury to determine first the voluntariness of a confession
and then the defendant's guilt or innocence with the instruction that
if the confession were found to be involuntary the jury was to
disregard it in determining guilt. In reaching its decision, the Court
cited Frankfurter's dissent in Delli Paoli and concluded that the jury
could not be reasonably expected to follow an instruction which
required it to disregard an involuntary confession after it had
examined that same confession to determine if it was, in fact,
involuntary.34
29. For an example of the criticism of the Delli Paoli rule see 36 U. CIN. L. REv., supra
note 12. States rejecting Delli Paoli included California in People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518,
407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965) and New Jersey in State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 2i5
A.2d 352 (1965). For the views of those states which adhered to Delli Paoli see Kinsey v. State,
193 So. 2d 437 (Fla. App. 1967); People v.. Carver, 77 Ill. App. 2d 247, 257-58, 222 N.E.2d
17,23 (1966).
30. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
31. Id. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Supreme Court affirmed that the right
to cross-examination was included in the right of confrontation and incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment's concept of due process, thus becoming obligatory for the states.
32. 380 U.S. at 419-20.
33. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
34. Id. at 381-83.
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Bruton: THE DEMISE OF Delli Paoli
Bruton v. United States
In overruling Delli Paoli, the Supreme Court in Bruton stated
that Jackson v. Denno had repudiated the basic premise that it was
reasonably possible for a jury to follow sufficiently clear instructions
to disregard a nontestifying codefendant's confession in determining
another defendant's guilt.3 5 The Court cited with approval Judge
Traynor's opinion in People v. Arand'0 in which the California
Supreme Court held inadmissible in a joint trial a confession of a
nontestifying codefendant which strongly implicated another
defendant.3 7 Judge Traynor's opinion stated: "A jury cannot 'segre-
gate evidence into separate intellectual boxes,' . . . It cannot deter-
mine that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A has com-
mitted criminal acts with B and at the same time effectively ignore
the inevitable conclusion that B has committed those same criminal
acts with A.';3 After explicitly repudiating the Delli Paoli
premise, the Court attempted to answer some of the arguments against
overruling Delli Paoli. It recognized the advantages of joint trial
and implied that effective deletion of a codefendant's extrajudi-
cial statement would allow the introduction of such a statement
without infringing on the right of confrontation of the other
defendants.39 When effective deletion is not possible, the Court
found that denying a defendant the right of confrontation was too
high a price to pay for joint trial.4 0 In discussing the contention
that the maintenance of the jury system depended on the belief
that the jury would follow the judge's instructions, the Court
answered that although there were many circumstances in which
this belief was justified, there were others where human limita-
tions created so great a risk of the jury not following the in-
struction that the inadequacies of the system could not be
ignored.4' In an apparent effort to allay the fear that its holding
implied that certain exceptions to the hearsay rule raised
35. 391 U.S. at 126.
36. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
37. Id. at 527, 407 P.2d at 270, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
38. Id. at 529, 407 P.2d at 272, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
39. 391 U.S. at 133-34. For a procedure which would allow the introduction of an
effectively deleted confession in a joint trial, see notes 123-43 infra and accompanying text.
40. 391 U.S. at 134-35.
41. Id. at 135.
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constitutional questions under the confrontation clause,42 the Court
explicitly noted that it was not dealing with their constitutionality.4"
In Bruton the Court twice spoke of the defendant being denied
the right of confrontation because of the substantial risk that the
jury would disregard the judge's instruction and consider Evans'
extrajudicial statements in determining Bruton's guilt.44 However,
the Court failed to make clear whether this risk resulted from the
extreme weakness of the case against Bruton which the Solicitor
General, himself, conceded4 5 or from the mere admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession into evidence. This ambiguity
gives rise to several questions critical to the administration of
criminal justice. Specifically, is there a violation of a defendant's
right of confrontation every time the confession of a nontestifying
codefendant which implicates the defendant is admitted into
evidence, or is there a violation only when the jury's disregard of the
court's instruction could lead the jury to consider implications in the
confession which are not contained in any state evidence which is
admissible against the defendant? Further, once it is determined that
a violation of the right of confrontation has occurred, is the test of
reversible error an automatic one, a variation of the harmless error
test of Chapman v. California,." or a substantial weight test? For
42. See id. at 128 n.3. The fear which the Court sought to dissipate was that because Bruton
was denied his right of confrontation when his nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial
statements were introduced in the joint trial, then the introduction of a dying declaration or
a statement of a coconspirator may similarly deny a defendant's right of confrontation.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 128, 137.
45. See note 5 supra.
46. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
To better understand the Chapman harmless error test and the later discussion concerning
its application (see notes 60-64, 79, 109-17 infra and accompanying text), an examination of
the history of harmless error may be helpful. Every state and the federal government has a
harmless error statute to avoid the Exchequer rule that all errors in a trial require reversal.
The federal act, like the state acts, was intended to stop reversals for unimportant technical
errors. See People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 80-83, 429 P.2d 606, 618-21, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254,
266-68 (1967) (Traynor, J., dissenting), rev'd, 391 U.S. 470 (1968); 45 N.C.L. REV. 1044, 1049
(1967). These statutes were expanded to include constitutional errors. In Chapman the
Supreme Court held, after noting that some constitutional errors are never harmless, that
other constitutional errors are not reversible if the prosecution shows that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court said that the prosecutor must prove that the
error did not contribute to the conviction, 386 U.S. at 26, and explicitly rejected California's
overwhelming weight of the evidence test. Id. at 23-24. The holding in Chapman indicates that
despite the expansion of the harmless error test to constitutional errors, the scope of the test
is still a narrow one. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); United States v.
Maurice, 416 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1969).
Vol. 1970: 329]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
example, if the similar confessions of two nontestifying codefendants
are each admitted into evidence with a limiting instruction, (1) is
there a violation of the right of confrontation and (2) is there
reversible error?47 When it is determined which test is to be applied,
does the test apply retroactively?
The Supreme Court After Bruton
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have been concerned with
some of the questions created by Bruton. In Roberts v. Russell,5 a
case with facts that paralleled Bruton, the Court, in a per curiam
opinion, held Bruton retroactive, vacated judgment, and remanded
for further consideration in light of Bruton. The Court said that its
holding was required because the Bruton decision "went to the basis
of fair hearing and trial"49 and corrected a "serious [flaw] in the
fact-finding process at trial."50 Although this decision is consistent
with the Court's history of finding sixth amendment holdings involv-
ing jury trials to be retroactive, 51 it adds confusion to other questions
47. Consideration of the reversal tests indicates the importance of asking the two separate
questions: (1) Is there a violation of the right of confrontation? (2)ls there reversible error?
See notes 60-64, 79, 101-22 infra and accompanying text.
48. 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
49. Id. at 294, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965).
50. 392 U.S. at 294, quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967).
51. Although the Courteappears to be using the three-part test of Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967), of determining the purpose of-fe new standard, evaluating the extent of
reliance on the old standard, and predicting the effect of retroactivity on the administration
of justice, the Court may actually be using a different test: "Does the new standard involve a
sixth amendment right at a jury trial?" If it does, the new standard will be applied
retroactively; if not, the standard will not be so applied. Thus a new standard involving a
police function will not be held retroactive. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969)
(holding Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which involved federal eavesdropping,
not retroactive); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (holding Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378
(1968), which concerned state eavesdropping, not retroactive); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967) (holding Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), which dealt with line-ups, not retroactive); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719 (1966) (holding Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) not retroactive); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (holding
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) not retroactive). Furthermore, a new standard involving
a non-sixth amendment right at trial will generally not be held retroactive. See Halliday v.
United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (holding McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969),
which involved guilty plea procedures, not retroactive); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966)
(holding Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which concerned prosecutorial comment
on the failure to testify, not retroactive). But see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964),which
involved jury determination of the voluntariness of a confession, where the Court emphasized
that the reliability of the fact finding process was at stake. Several sixth amendment standards
have been held retroactive. See Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (holding Barber v.
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presented by Bruton. That the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant's confession is a per se violation of a defendant's right
of confrontation and requires an automatic reversal is suggested by
the retroactive holding in Roberts, for the Court generally holds
retroactive only those cases involving errors which require automatic
reversal.12 On the other hand, the Court's remand of the case to the
district court for further consideration would seem to indicate that
reversal is not automatic. It has been claimed that this vacating and
remanding has the further significance of indicating that the
admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession is not a per
se violation of the defendant's right of confrontation.5 3 However, the
Supreme Court's subsequent remanding of three cases54 in which the
codefendant did take the stand would seem to indicate that the Court
was not defining Bruton's scope when it remanded Roberts.
In Frazier v. Cupp,55 where the prosecutor included in his
opening statement a summary of the testimony he expected a co-
indictee, who had pleaded guilty, to give, where the summary
suggested that the testimony would implicate the petitioner, and
where the co-indictee invoked the privilege against self incrimination
and did not testify, the Court held that Bruton did not require
reversal." Bruton was distinguished on the basis that the mental
gymnastics required of the jury in Bruton in considering evidence
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), which involved prosecutorial good faith in securing witnesses
when the prosecution introduces the witnesses' former testimony, retroactive); Arsenault v.
Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (holding White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), which
concerned the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing, retroactive); McConell v. Rhay, 393
U.S. 2 (1968) (holding Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), which dealt with the right of
counsel at a probation revocation hearing, retroactive); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (right to counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel at trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (right to counsel afarraignment);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to a transcript on appeal). But see DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (holding Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) and Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), each of which concerned state denial of a jury trial, not
retroactive).
The new test readily explains Roberts, holding Bruton retroactive. Bruton involves the sixth
amendment right of confrontation in a jury trial. The inadequacies of the Stovall test are
apparent when the Court does not even discuss the third factor of the Stovall test and ignores
the near unanimous approval of Delli Paoli by the state courts.
52. See note 51 supra.
53. See Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae at 8, Harrington v. California,
395 U.S. 250 (1969).
54. Hunt v. Connecticut, 392 U.S. 304 (1968); Santoro v. United States, 392 U.S. 301
(1968); United States v. Bujese, 392 U.S. 297 (1968).
55. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
56. Id. at 735.
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against only one of two defendants was not present in Frazier, that
the statements were before the trial and could be easily segregated
by the jury and that the inadmissible evidence was not a vital part
of the prosecution's case as it was in Bruton.57 Although Frazier
does not involve the mental gymnastics of Bruton, the Court's
emphasis on the confession not being an important part of the
prosecution's case suggests that the mere admission bf a
nontestifying codefendant's confession is not reversible error.58
The suggestions in Bruton, Roberts, and Frazier that the
standard of reversal must be one which considers the content of the
confession in light of the other evidence in the case was given support
in Harrington v. California59 where the Court applied the Chapman
"harmless error test.""0 Harrington involved four defendants, three
Negroes and Harrington, a Caucasian, who were charged with
felony murder. The evidence against Harrington consisted of the
testimony of a codefendant who placed Harrington at the robbery
scene and the identification testimony of eyewitnesses who had at
first said all the robbers were Negroes."1 The confessions of the other
nontestifying codefendants which implicated Harrington were
admitted subject to the Delli Paoli instruction. Harrington did not
confess. The Supreme Court affirmed Harrington's conviction by
holding that any error in admitting the confessions was harmless
under the Chapman test. 2 In so holding the Court said: "[The case
against Harrington] is so overwhelming that unless we say no
violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this
state conviction undisturbed."63 Justice Brennan speaking for three
dissenters claimed that the majority had in reality overruled
57. Id.
58. The Court in Frazier twice spoke of the importance of the codefendant's extrajudicial
statement in the prosecution's case. The Court first observed that "unlike the situation in
either Douglas or Bruton, [the codefendant's] statement was not a vitally important part of
the prosecution's case." 394 U.S. at 735. The Court then concluded:
At least where the anticipated, and unproduced, evidence is not touted to the jury as a
crucial part of the prosecution's case, "it is hard for us to imagine that the minds of
the jurors would be so influenced by such incidental statements during this long trial
that they would not appraise the evidence objectively and dispassionately." Id. at 736.
See United States v. Maurice, 416 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Carlson, No.
23,337 (9th Cir., Feb. 2, 1970).
59. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
60. See note 46 supra.
61. 395 U.S. at 253.
62. Id. at 254.
63. Id.
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Chapman and its requirement that for a constitutional error to be
harmless the state must show that the error made no contribution
to the criminal conviction.64 The question of the dilution of
Chapman aside, however, because Harrington involved a case tried
before Bruton, it is not absolute authority for the proposition that
the Chapman test is always applicable. Rather it may possibly be
limited to cases tried before Bruton, while an automatic reversal test
may be proper for post-Bruton cases. Such a reading of Harrington
would enable the courts to follow the suggestion of some
commentators who would apply the harmless error test retroactively
and the automatic reversal test prospectively." Whether or not this
reading of Harrington is acceptable, the opinion does indicate that
an error, reversible or otherwise, occurs whenever a confession of a
nontestifying codefendant which implicates another defendant is
admitted into evidence.
THE SCOPE OF Bruton
Since the Supreme Court's decisions in Bruton and Roberts, the
lower federal courts and the state courts have been flooded by
Bruton claims. Although the courts agree that Bruton applies to
state trials6 and that the decision is based on the right of
confrontation,67 the courts are divided both as to the scope of Bruton
and the reversible error test to be applied. As compared to the
situation where the codefendant has not taken the stand, the question
of Bruton's scope when the defendant has testified has created less
difficulty for the courts. Generally, Bruton has been held not to
apply in this instance, since the guarantee of confrontation is not
breached." Some courts seem to suggest that this inapplicability is
absolute." Others have applied Bruton where the codefendant took
64. Id. at 255. See Jones v. State, 227 So. 2d 326 (Fla. App. 1969), for an example of the
dissent's fear that the lower court would read Harrington as a weakening of Chapman. See
Note, Harmless Constitution Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814, 819-20 (1970).
See also People v. Smith, 84 Cal. Rptr. 229 (Ct. App. 1970).
65. See notes 132-39 infra and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 54 N.J. 37, 41, 252 A.2d 726, 730 (1969). This application
of Bruton to state cases is explicitly required by Roberts v. Russell, 293 U.S. 293 (1968).
67. E.g., United States v. Harris, 409 F.2d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 1969).
68. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 409 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1969); Parker v. United States,
404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968); Lipscomb v. State, 5 Md. App. 500, 248 A.2d 491 (1968);
State v. Richard, 251 A.2d 326 (N.H. 1969); see The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 63, 237 (1968). But see Bujese v. United States, 405 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
69. See, e.g. United States v. Sims, 297 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); People v. Ross,
41 111. 2d 445, 244 N.E.2d 608 (1969). But see In re Whitehorn, 462 P.2d 361, 82 Cal. Rptr.
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the stand and invoked the fifth amendment after being read his
confession70 or where the codefedant after taking the stand denied
making the confession 7 Still others have applied Bruton where both
defendants had the same lawyer. These courts based their holdings
on the theory that the right of confrontation secured by Bruton
includes the right to an effective cross-examination. The emphasis in
Bruton on cross-examination would seem to indicate that the
Supreme Court intended to assure a defendant more than a
theoretical right to cross-examine his codefendant.
The conflict in the courts' determination of the scope of Bruton
when the codefendant does not testify is first presented by the
threshold question: What is incriminating?73 Bruton and Roberts
spoke of the denial of the right to confrontation in the situation
where the jury might consider a nontestifying codefendant's extra-
judicial statements which implicate or incriminate another
defendant. When the codefendant's statement in no way incriminates
or implicates another defendant, that defendant cannot claim
prejudice. All courts would probably agree with the Florida Supreme
Court's holding that a statement which tells how the murder was
committed, where the murder weapon was hidden, and where the
body was buried was incriminatory 4 Similarly, most courts would
hold as not incriminatory the deleted confession of a nontestifying
codefendant introduced as follows:
609 (Cal. 1969), where the California Supreme Court found that the introduction of a
confession of a codefendant who takes the stand is error, the reversibility of which is to be
determined by using the Chapman test. Using the Chapman test the court held the error
harmless. 462 P.2d at 368, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 617. The court's finding of error would seem to
be an overreading of Bruton. Bruton did not hold that the introduction of a codefendant's
confession was error if the codefendant was subject to cross-examination. Rather, Bruton held
that error occurred when the defendant was denied his right to cross-examine his codefendant.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Determination of whether there is error which
is harmless or whether there is no error at all gains importance in the application of an
automatic reversal test. See notes 132-40 infra and accompanying text.
70. Goodwin v. Page, 296 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (E.D. Okla. 1969).
71. O'Neil v. Nelson, No. 23,149 (9th Cir., Jan. 26, 1970); Townsend v. Henderson, 405
F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1968).
72. State v. Coleman, 9 Ariz. App. 526, 454 P.2d 196 (1969). The presence of a single
lawyer obviously denies effective cross-examination of the codefendant. Yet this does not mean
that the mere failure of counsel to cross-examine is reversible error. See United States ex rel.
Hundley v. Pinto, 413 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1969). See generally People v. Anthony, 249 N.E.2d
747, 749 (1969).
73. For a possible answer to the question "What is incriminating?" see note 124 infra and
accompanying text.
74. Schneble v. State, 215 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1968).
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Q (by the prosecutor)-
Will you tell us what [the codefendant] indicated to you insofar as he himself
is concerned?.
A (by the police officer)-
He orally admitted his participation in the robbery.75
However, in the large area between these extremes there exists
uncertainty. Some courts require that the defendant must be
inculpated directly76 and that the defendant is not incriminated by
statements referring to "other fellows" which do not refer to the
defendant by name.7 7 Other courts hold that the defendant need not
be directly incriminated. 7 The Bruton case made no distinction
between directly and indirectly incriminating statements, but, rather,
was concerned with whether the defendant was, in fact, incriminated.
Further, any direct-indirect distinction seems to be an unjustified
limitation on the right of confrontation, which enables a court to
couch its decision in terms of the applicability of Bruton and to
avoid utilization of the Chapman harmless error test which nearly
always requires a reversal. 79 This avoidance technique is best seen in
cases where both defendants who have made similar confessions do
not testify and their confessions are admitted into evidence subject
to the limiting instruction. In such cases, a court, instead of finding
error and then applying the Chapman test as required by
Harrington, may simply say that the codefendant's confession does
not implicate the defendant, even though it adds support to the
defendant's own confession80
If a court decides that a nontestifying codefendant's statements
incriminate another defendant, it must then determine the
applicability of Bruton in light of the hearsay exceptions, the limited
admissibility doctrine, the concept of waiver, and the techniques of
impeachment. The Court in Bruton specifically stated that it was not
deciding any constitutional questions arising under the hearsay
75. State v. Parker, 74 Wash. 2d 269, 272, 444 P.2d 796, 798 (1968). However, where the
confession is more extensive, the deletion of such references may prejudice the confessor by
suggesting that he was the sole actor. 82 HARV. L. REv., supra note 68, at 238.
76. E.g., United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1969).
77. E.g., United States v. Lipowitz, 407 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1969).
78. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bosman, 213 Pa. Super. 258, 247 A.2d 647 (1968).
79. See United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968). The court's statement that
"even if it be considered error, [it] was harmless" appears to be mere dicta added after the
court had decided that Bruton did not apply. Id. at 988.
80. See United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Scott, 245 N.E.2d 415
(Mass. 1969).
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exceptions, 8 ' and in cases since Bruton the lower courts have
consistently held that Bruton does not apply to such exceptions."
The California Supreme Court in People v. Brawleys held that
Bruton did not apply to the coconspirator's exception to the hearsay
rule!' The basis of this decision was that Bruton did not deal with
the exceptions to the hearsay rule, that the constitutionality of the
coconspirators exception has long been recognized, and that because
of the need for such evidence the exception will continue to be
recognized 5
The doctrine of limited admissibility which allows evidence to
be introduced for only a limited purpose has been the subject of
much Bruton litigation. Because Bruton was concerned with the
denial of the right of confrontation and not with the prejudicial
effect of the limited admissibility doctrine,86 the courts have held
Bruton inapplicable where the problem is strictly one of limited
admissibility. Thus, it has been held that in a trial involving a multi-
count indictment where the evidence admitted to prove one count
might be misused by the jury to determine guilt under another count,
Bruton does not apply.87 Similarly, where a codefendant's statements
are admitted to show the defendant's silence when silence can be
taken as an admission against interest, Bruton has been held
inapplicable. 8 However, where the right of confrontation rather than
limited admissibility is the central issue, such as when a
81. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 n.10 (1968). The hearsay exception which
has special significance in a joint trial is the exception which allows the introduction into
evidence of a statement made by a coconspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy.
82. See, e.g., Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 165 S.E.2d 708 (1969).
83. 82 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
84. Id. at 169.
85. Id.; see 72 HARV. L. REV., supra note 16, at 983; 113 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 16,
at 754.
86. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. Bruton's discussion of circumstances
under which the jury cannot be presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions would
seem to raise serious questions concerning limited admissibility, 391 U.S. at 135-36; cf. United
States v. Heft, 413 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1969). However, the Court's emphasis on the right of
confrontation and the Court's holding based on this right indicate that the Court was not
dealing with the validity of the limited admissibility rule. Further, the Court recognized that
in many cases, such as those where questions of limited admissibility may arise, the jury can
be presumed to have followed the judge's instructions. 391 U.S. at 135.
87. See United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. American
Oil Co., 291 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1968); cf. United States v. Hoffa, 402 F.2d 380, 386 (7th
Cir. 1968).
88. State v.McLain, 222 So. 2d 855 (La. 1969). When evidence of a defendant's silence is
admitted it is solely for showing the silence of the defendant.
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nontestifying codefendant's civil depositions are admitted into
evidence in a criminal trial 9 or where the confession of the
nontestifying principal is admitted into evidence at the trial of the
accomplice to show the principal's guilt, 0 Bruton has been applied.
The decision in the latter case seems to be justified as a means of
preventing the prosecution from doing at a separate trial what
Bruton prevents it from doing at a joint trial.
In the area of waiver and impeachment the courts have had an
opportunity to set a varied pattern of decisions. One court has ruled
that endorsing a codefendant's confession waives a defendant's
Bruton rights,9 while another has held that, this endorsement can
occur if the extrajudicial statements of the codefendants agree in the
details of the crime.92 A third court, however, has held that
endorsement does not avoid Bruton.13 It would seem that the waiver
of a constitutional right, such as the right of confrontation, should
not be assumed as easily as in the first two cases above. The pattern
set by the third case and decisions which have' adhered to its
principle seem more in accord with the Supreme Court's reminder
in Miranda" that "[t]his court has always set high standards of
proof for waiver of constitutional rights."9 It may even be argued
that the state cannot meet this burden of proof unless the defendant's
counsel is present when the waiver is made.8 Where impeachment
is at issue, the courts have consistently held Bruton inapplicable.9 7
This, however, does not mean that Bruton is inapplicable whenever
89. Cf. United States v. Detroit Vital Foods, Inc., 407 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1969)
(evidence adduced as a result of a codefendant's confession is inadmissible in a joint trial),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Kordel, 90 S. Ct. 763 (1970) (reversed on the basis that the
codefendant's statements never were admitted into evidence).
90, Schepps v. State, 432 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1968).
91. State v. Greer, 202 Kan. 212, 447 P.2d 837 (1968).
92. People v. Osuna, 452 P.2d 678, 76 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1969).
93. Smithson v. State, 5 Md. App. 378, 247 A.2d 542 (1968).
94. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. Id. at 475.
96. The suggestion that the presence of the defendant's counsel may be required to make
an effective endorsement is based on the theory that endorsement is a critical stage of the
procedural system. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967). By endorsing a
codefendant's confession one may well be determining the outcome of his trial.
For a problem related to waiver, that of rendering any error harmless by the defendant
testifying to the validity of the codefendant's confession, see United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d
505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968).
97. E.g., Javor v. United States, 403 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Boone, 401
F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1968); Minor v. State, 6 Md. App. 82, 250 A.2d 113 (1969); State v.
Cartagena, 40 Wis. 2d 213, 161 N.W.2d 392 (1968).
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the codefendant's confession is used for impeachment purposes, be
it to impeach a codefendant or a codefendant's character witness.
Usually the confession is used to impeach a codefendant who has
been called by the defendant to testify. In such a case when the
confession is introduced in cross-examination the defendant can
confront the codefendant on redirect concerning the confession. 8
However, where the confession is used to impeach a character
witness, a different question is raised. Where the witness is simply
asked if he knew that the codefendant had confessed, it has been held
that Bruton is inapplicable because the question did not suggest that
the confession incriminated the other defendant. 9 But if the
prosecutor asked the same question and then read the complete
confession which incriminated the other defendant, it would seem
-that the defendant has been effectively denied his right of
confrontation.1 00
APPELLATE REVIEW AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN Bruton SITUATIONS
Regardless of how broad or narrow'a reading is given to Bruton,
if a court limits review, of Bruton errors, the effectiveness of Bruton
will be correlatively impaired. Some courts have treated Bruton
cases as analogous to those involving nonconstitutional evidentiary
rulings where the appellate court will not hear an objection not made
at the trial level.10' This position severely limits the effect of Roberts
v. RussellI 0 2 which held Bruton retroactive, because when Delli Paoli
was the law there was generally little reason to object to the court's
admitting into evidence a nontestifying codefendant's confession
implicating the defendant, assuming the proper instruction was given
to the jury.10 3 Under such circumstances, a court should not treat a
98. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 32 (1954). when the defendant calls the codefendant
to testify and the codefendant's confession is introduced in cross-examination of the
codefendant, the defendant's right to an effective cross-examination secured by Bruton
becomes the right to an effective redirect examination. Therefore, if the codefendant on cross-
examination denies making the confession or invokes the privilege against self-incrimination,
the defendant has been denied the right of confrontation. See notes 70-71 supra and
accompanying text.
99. United States v. Safley, 408 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1969).
100. Cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (discussed in Bruton).
101. See People v. Shirk, 14 Mich. App. 623, 166 N.W.2d 21 (1968). See also People v.
Floyd, 464 P.2d 64, 80-81, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 624-25 (1970). But see People v. Baker, 23
N.Y.2d 307, 244 N.E.2d 232, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1968); cf. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92
(1966).
102. 392 U.S. 293 (1968). See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text.
103. Cf. \People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 182 N.E.2d 100, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1962). See
note 27 supra and accompanying text. The view that no objection to the admission of the
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constitutional right as waived because no objection had been made
at the trial level. However, in cases tried after Bruton the failure.to
object should waive the right unless plain error is shown by-the.
record. 04
The Test for Reversible Error under Bruton
If the court chooses to review a Bruton claim and determines
that the Bruton rationale is applicable to that claim, the court must
then decide what reversible error test to apply. The courts have
utilized three basic tests. The first, utilized only by North Carolina,
is an automatic reversal test which requires a separate trial to be
held whenever a codefendant's confession incriminates another
defendant.1 5 Using this test, the North Carolina courts have reversed
where the confessions of two codefendants were substantially the
same and each confession was admitted into evidence with the Delli
Paoli instruction. 10 Although this test is not constitutionally
required under Harrington v. California,0 7 and although most courts
have rejected it, it would seem to find analogical support in other
sixth amendment cases which have been held retroactive and which
require automatic reversal.0 8 The second test utilized by the courts
is the Chapman v. California'0 9 harmless error test. This is the test
the Supreme Court said it applied in Harrington. Yet, as discussed
previously, the Harrington test may be a diluted form of the
Chapman test."0 Even so, this standard has an advantage over the
weight of the evidence test in that it places the burden of proof on
codefendant's confession in a trial before Bruton does not waive the defendant's right to
confrontation gains support from the fact that Bruton did not make any objection to the
introduction of his codefendant's confession at the trial level. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d
355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967).
104. A suggested test for finding plain error is found in United States ex rel. Gainer v. New
Jersey, 278 F. Supp. 127 (D.N.J. 1967).
When it appears clearly during the course of trial. . . that there is doubt as to whether
defense counsel may be aware of a fundamental constitutional right of his client,
inquiry out of the presence of the jury is indicated to make certain whether or not there
is knowledge of the right and an intelligent waiver thereof by the defendant. Id. at 131.
If there is doubt and no inquiry has bden made, the reviewing court should find plain error
and order a new trial.
105. See State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 291, 163 S.E.2d 492, 502 (1968).
106. See, e.g., State v. Justice, 3 N.C. App. 363, 165 S.E.2d 47 (1969).
107. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 51 supra. Cf. 83 HARV. L. REV., supra note 64, at 820-24; 16 Am. U.L. REv.
416,419 (1967).
109. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See note 46 supra.
110. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
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the prosecutor to show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."' In United States v. Maurice,"2 where Maurice's
defense was that he was not a party to the sale of marijuana and
where the other defendant's lawyer opened his case by stating that
Maurice had taken part in the sale by giving the narcotics to his
client to deliver, the Seventh Circuit, while recognizing that it is a
rare case when an appellate court may hold an error harmless under
the Chapman test, held that upon the basis of Harrington such an
error had occurred." 3 The courts have tended to apply the Chapman
test only where even a substantial weight test would require reversal.
In cases where a Chapman test would require a reversal and a
substantial weight test would not, courts have generally applied a
substantial weight test. Thus, where the confessions of two
defendants have varied materially"' or where a prosecutor has
commented extensively on a nontestifying codefendant's
confession," 5 Chapman has been readily applied, while only a few
courts have applied the test where the other evidence in the case was
legally sufficient to sustain a conviction."' Even when the Chapman
test is applied in a case where the other evidence is legally sufficient
to sustain a conviction, there is the risk that in applying the
Harrington variation of the test a court may consider evidence which
adds nothing to the making of a prima facie case as harmless even
though it tends to make the other evidence more believable."7 The
third test, the weight of the evidence test, which was used extensively
before Harrington, has been applied where there is enough other
evidence to support the verdict."' It has also been applied where the
same verdict would have been reached without the confessions,"'
111. See notes 118-22 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the weight of the
evidence test. In some weight of the evidence tests the burden was on the accused and not on
the prosecution. See People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 83, 429 P.2d 606, 620, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254,
268 (1967), rev'dper curiam, 391 U.S. 470 (1968).
112. 416 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1969).
113. Id.; see People v. Fortman, 84 Cal. Rptr. 458 (Ct. App. 1970).
114. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Yeager, 399 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1027 (1969).
115. People v. Mirenda, 23 N.Y.2d 439, 245 N.E.2d 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1969); see
West v. Henderson, 409 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Sims v. United States, 405 F.2d
1381 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
116. E.g., People v. Boone, 22 N.Y.2d 476, 239 N.E.2d 885, 293 N.Y.S.2d 287, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 991 (1968).
117. See Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 30 U. PiTT. L. REV. 553, 558 (1969).
118. People v. Rhodes, 41 111.2d 494, 244 N.E.2d 145 (1969).
119. State v. Aiken, 452 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969).
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where the other evidence was strong, 1 2 and where other strong
evidence contradicted the confession.12' This test is no longer
constitutionally permissible as a result of Harrington which found
that the test did not provide adequate protection of a defendant's
right of confrontation. 122
SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF Bruton PROBLEMS
It is submitted that a three stage procedure for the resolution of
Bruton problems should be utilized. As put forth by the New Jersey
Court Rules, the first step would require a motion by the state before
trial:
If 2 or more defendants are to be jointly tried and the prosecuting attorney
intends to introduce at trial a statement, confession, or admission of one
defendant involving any other defendant, he shall move before trial on notice
to all defendants for a determination by the court, in camera, as to whether
such portion of the statement, confession, or admission involving such other
defendants can be effectively deleted therefrom. The court shall direct the
specific deletions to be made, or, if it finds that effective deletions cannot
practically be made, it shall order separate trials . .. . ,
The New Jersey court has defined "effective deletion" as "the
elimination of not only direct and indirect identification of co-
defendants but of any statement that could be damaging to the co-
defendants once their identity is otherwise established.' ' 24 This
definition, which is consistent with Bruton in making no distinction
between directly and indirectly incriminating statements,' 25 makes
such references as- to "X, Y, or Z,' '1 26 or to "another Negro
male,' ' 27 or to "Blank '' 28 ineffective deletions.12 At trial, the second
120. People v. Rosochacki, 41111. 2d 483, 244 N.E.2d 136 (1969).
121. People v. Colletti, 101 111. App. 2d 51 , 242 N.E.2d 63 (1968).
122. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969).
123. N.J. CT. R. 3:15-2(a) (Supp. 1969). The first step of the proposed resolution of Bruton
problems is also based on the opinions of People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265,
47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965) and State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965). See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 14. If the prosecutor does not have access to a confession but has knowledge of its
existence, he should be required to state such knowledge at the pre-trial hearing. This
requirement would prevent the prosecutor from ignoring the first step in the proposed
procedure in such cases as when the confession is made out of his jurisdiction and he has not
yet tried or been able to obtain the confession. See Carlson, False or Suppressed Evidence:
Why a Need for the Prosecutorial Tie? 1969 DuKE L.J. 1171, 1181-87.
124. State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965).
125. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
126. See People v. Jackson, 22 N.Y.2d 446, 239 N.E.2d 869, 293 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1968).
127. See State v. Taylor, 104 Ariz. 264, 251 P.2d 312 (1968).
128. See People v. Johnson, 13 Il. 2d 619, 150 N.E.2d 597 (1958).
129. In United States ex rel. LaBelle v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1968), it was held
that if the portions of a codefendant's confession which elculpate the codefendant are deleted
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stage of this procedure would go into effect. The judge would not
admit into evidence a codefendant's confession which had not been
the subject of a pretrial motion unless the prosecutor could show,
in a voir dire with the jury excused, that he did not possess or have
access to the confession before trial.30 If this burden is met, the
judge would continue the voir dire, hear the confession, and make a
ruling as to its admissibility and as to any necessary deletions. 3,' The
third stage of this suggested procedure, the appeal stage, has two
variations. If the trial of the case occurred before Bruton the
reversible error test would be the Harrington variation of the
Chapman harmless error test. This standard, although it does not
protect the rights of a defendant as completely as an automatic
reversal test, does provide a sufficient amount of protection by
putting the burden on the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.' Further,
since the retroactive application of an automatic reversal test would
not have an increased deterrent effect over the Harrington test 33 and
because of the difficulty of proving old cases,' the Harrington test
seems to be the proper one when considering the retroactive
application of Bruton. However, for cases tried after Bruton,
because the prosecutor should have knowledge of Bruton,'3 1 because
the problem of proving an old case is not present, and because of
the-difficulty of determining the absence of prejudice beyond a
reasonable doubt,' the automatic reversal test utilized in other sixth
amendment areas should be applied. This procedure would provide
maximum protection for the defendant and deter the prosecution
from attempting to evade Bruton. 37 Because Harrington requires
there is reversible error as to the codefendant. Thus, a prosecutor wishing to have a joint trial
must not only effectively delete those parts of the confession which incriminate another
defendant, but he must also not delete those portions which exculpate the confessor.
130. This automatic reversal test gives substancb to the New Jersey rule which allows the
judge "to admit such confession ...or take such other action as the interest of justice
requires." N.J. CT. R. 3:15-2(a) (Supp. 1969).
131. See State v. Parlker, 74 Wash. 2d 269, 272, 444 P.2d 796, 798 (1968).
132. See notes 59-64, 109-17 supra and accompanying text.
133. See 30 U. PIr. L. REv., supra note 117, at 557.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California,
53 MINN. L. REv. 519, 541 (1969).
137. Id. at 548; cf. Jones v. State, 227 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. App. 1969).
When the defendant fails to object at the trial to the introduction of a nontestifying
codefendant's extrajudicial statement the appellate court should apply the plain error test. See
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that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the convictionl38 it would seem that any added
cost resulting from the ordering of a few additional trials under the
automatic reversal test would be offset by the saving of judicial time
at the appellate level.139 The appellate court would still have to
determine the scope of Bruton,4 0 but once this were done the court
would simply affirm or reverse.
Each of the stages in the procedure is made more effective by the
successful operation of the other stages. The first and second stages
are enhanced in effectiveness by the automatic reversal test. Instead
of having to determine first whether Bruton applies and then, if it
does apply, whether admission of a codefendant's statement will be
grounds for reversal,' the trial judge need only determine the first
question-the scope of Bruton. He knows that he will be reversed if
he admits the statement without proper deletion when Bruton
applies. The third stage is aided by the admissibility test of the first
two stages. New Jersey includes as incriminating almost any
reference to a defendant in a codefendant's confession4 2 and,
therefore, simplifes the reviewing court's determination of what is
incriminating. The court no longer needs to concern itself with
whether a statement is directly or indirectly incriminating or whether
it adds new information or is merely cumulative.4 3 The first two
stages are interrelated in that the first stage limits the need for a voir
note 104 supra. Further, there would be a strong tendency when there is an automatic reversal
test to find that defendant's counsel was not aware of his client's rights if the counsel failed
to object to the introduction of a confession which implicated his client. Such a finding should
require a new trial.
138. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
139. It is apparent that the argument that there will be few additional reversals under an
automatic reversal test suggests that such a test should be applied not only prospectively but
also retroactively. However, because of the difficulty of proving old cases and because the
prosecutor did not know he was violating the defendant's rights by introducing a nontestifying
codefendant's confession the above suggestion should be rejected. See-notes 133-35 supra and
accompanying text.
140. The threshold determination of what is incriminating is a simple one if the broad New
Jersey approach is taken. See notes 73-80, 123-24 supra and accompanying text. The court's
main task then becomes the determination of the scope of Bruton in the hearsay exception,
limited admissibility, waiver, and impeachment areas. See notes 81-100 supra and
accompanying text.
141. The trial judge's decision under the Chapman test can be a very difficult one. This
difficulty would seem to be extremely acute where the statement is offered into evidence before
all the other state evidence is presented. In such a situation a determination of what is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt may be little more than a hopeful guess.
142. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
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dire during the trial and the second stage's requirement that the
prosecution prove that it did not have access to the confession before
trial enforces the pre-trial motion requirement while permitting the
prosecution to introduce evidence which is not prejudicial to the
defendant and to which the prosecution did not have access before
trial. By utilizing this three stage procedure courts will be protecting
the defendant's Bruton rights while eliminating much of the
confusion which surrounds the Bruton holding.
